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New PRC Trade War Measures; POTUS Exec Order & RE; U.S. Rare Earth Market Details; Newsweek's Fake News; Myanmar's RE trade with China; UUUU, REEMF, LKAB, LYC, JL Mag, Niron, EMT and the lot
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New PRC Trade War Measures; POTUS Exec Order & RE; U.S. Rare Earth Market Details; Newsweek's Fake News; Myanmar's RE trade with China; UUUU, REEMF, LKAB, LYC, JL Mag, Niron, EMT and the lot

Rare Earth 4 February 2025 #166

Feb 04, 2025
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Trumpian tariffs

First they are coming, then they are delayed by 30 days - the punitive tariffs for Canada and Mexico. Perhaps they are not coming at all. But who knows?

Meanwhile, not only Canada and Mexico, also the EU and UK are threatened with the same.

China reacted to punitive U.S. tariffs promptly and raised own punitive tariffs on U.S. goods plus it induced a further tightening of dual-use goods regulation - and that during China’s national Spring Festival holidays. See details below

Any WTO suits launched against the U.S. by Canada, Mexico and China are likely to outlast the ca. 1,370 days until the next U.S. presidential elections (and subsequent traditional storming of the Capitol?). Even if faster, this U.S. administration is likely to ignore international legal awards, just like in 2016 China ignored the The South China Sea Arbitration Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which had ruled in favour of the Philippines.

On Greenland the U.S. president showered the Danish prime minister with abuse and threats during a 45 minute call. Denmark & Greenland are part of NATO, the U.S. can place the entire U.S. Army on Greenland, if it wants to. Where is the issue? Threats of course included tariffs on Danish goods. In terms of mineral riches Trump and his administration of obviously exquisit experts do not realise, that they are buying into junior miner hype and deception.

Next in line: China’s Xi Jin Ping, the kind of people Trump shows some respect for. Last time, in 2017, the Trump administration even let China take control of the rare earth assets at Mountain Pass - ignoring all pleas and warnings.

The Chinese foreign minister is due in Japan this month. In view of U.S. behaviour, Wang Yi may receive a much warmer welcome than originally anticipated. However, China’s abuse of dual-use regulation under the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty for potentially embargoing exports of rare metal compounds/alloys to Japan (and Korea) may not go down well.

Just like last time the U.S. Republican administration will likely not be responsive to rationality and reason. Therefore, lets do it like Statler & Waldorf. Sit back, and enjoy watching this Muppet Show unfold on stage. In latest 4 years it will be over. No re-runs are likely, so don’t miss an episode!


As usual, we bring you the originals plus facts & figures

Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 10 of 2025 Announcement on the Decision to Implement Export Control on Tungsten, Tellurium, Bismuth, Molybdenum and Indium Related Items

In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China, the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, the Customs Law of the People's Republic of China, and the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, with the approval of the State Council, it is decided to implement export control on the following items:

I. Tungsten Related Items

(I) 1C117.d. Tungsten Related Materials:

1. Ammonium Paratungstate (reference customs commodity number: 2841801000) [Export to the U.S. in 2024: zero]

2. Tungsten Oxide (reference customs commodity number: 2825901200 [Export to the U.S. 2024: 23.1 mt, US$835,176], 2825901910, 2825901920 [Both combined export to the U.S. 2024: 41 kgs, US$7,830];

3. Tungsten carbide not controlled under 1C226 (reference customs commodity number: 2849902000 [Export to the U.S. 2024: 238.7 mt, US$10.7 mio]).

(II) 1C117.c. Solid tungsten with all of the following characteristics:

1. Solid tungsten with any of the following characteristics (excluding particles and powder):

a. Tungsten and tungsten alloys with a tungsten content greater than or equal to 97% (by weight) not controlled under 1C226 or 1C241 (reference customs commodity numbers: 8101940001 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 227.5 mt, US$10.1 mio], 8101991001 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 59 mt, US$3.7 mio], 8101999001 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 118 mt, US$7.5 mio]);

b. Tungsten doped with copper with a tungsten content greater than or equal to 80% (by weight) (reference customs commodity numbers: 8101940001, 8101991001, 8101999001 [same as items under 1 a above]);

c. Tungsten doped with silver (silver content greater than or equal to 2%) with a tungsten content greater than or equal to 80% (by weight) (reference customs commodity number: 7106919001 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 338 kgs, US$3,500] , 7106929001 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 149 kgs, US$24,000]);

2. Can be machined into any of the following products:

a. Cylinders with a diameter greater than or equal to 120 mm and a length greater than or equal to 50 mm;

b. Tubes with an inner diameter greater than or equal to 65 mm, a wall thickness greater than or equal to 25 mm and a length greater than or equal to 50 mm;

c. Blocks with a size greater than or equal to 120 mm×120 mm×50 mm.

(III) 1C004 Tungsten-nickel-iron alloys (reference customs commodity numbers: 8101940001, 8101991001, 8101999001) or tungsten-nickel-copper alloys (reference customs commodity numbers: 8101940001, 8101991001, 8101999001) [same as items under 1a above] having all of the following characteristics:

a. Density greater than 17.5 g/cm3;

b. Elastic limit greater than 800 MPa;

c. Ultimate tensile strength greater than 1270 MPa;

d. Elongation greater than 8%.

(IV) 1E004, 1E101.b. Technology and information (including process specifications, process parameters, processing procedures, etc.) for the production of 1C004, 1C117.c, 1C117.d.

II. Tellurium-related items

(I) 6C002.a. Tellurium metal (reference customs commodity number: 2804500001).

(II) 6C002.b. Any of the following tellurium compound single crystal or polycrystalline products (including substrates or epitaxial wafers):

1. Cadmium telluride (reference customs commodity number: 2842902000 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 2 kgs, US$117], 3818009021 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 17.7 mt, US$21.3 mio]);

2. Cadmium zinc telluride (reference customs commodity number: 2842909025 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 214 kgs, US$5.6 mio], 3818009021 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 17.7 mt, US$21 mio]);

3. Mercury cadmium telluride (reference customs commodity number: 2852100010 [zero exports at all], 3818009021 [same as under 2. above]).

(III) 6E002 Technology and information for the production of 6C002 items (including process specifications, process parameters, processing procedures, etc.).

III. Bismuth-related items

(I) 6C001.a. Bismuth metal and its products not controlled under 1C229, including but not limited to ingots, blocks, beads, granules, powders and other forms (reference customs commodity numbers: 8106101091, 8106101092, 8106101099 [all three export to the U.S. 2024: 688 mt, US$7.5 mio], 8106109090 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 218 mt, US$2.7 mio], 8106901019, 8106901029, 8106901099 [[all three export to the U.S. 2024: 1 kg; US$350], 8106909090 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 565 kgs, US$10,517 in total]).

(ii) 6C001.b. Bismuth germanate (reference customs commodity number: 2841900041 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 118 mt, US$5.4 mio]).

(iii) 6C001.c. Triphenyl bismuth (reference customs commodity number: 2931900032 [included in (ii) above]).

(iv) 6C001.d. Tri-p-ethoxyphenyl bismuth (reference customs commodity number: 2931900032 [included in (ii) above]).

(V) 6E001 Technology and information for the production of item 6C001 (including process specifications, process parameters, processing procedures, etc.).

IV. Molybdenum-related items

(I) 1C117.b. Molybdenum powder: Molybdenum and alloy particles with a molybdenum content (by weight) greater than or equal to 97% and a particle size less than or equal to 50×10-6m (50μm) for the manufacture of missile components (reference customs commodity number: 8102100001 [Export to the U.S. in 2024: 59 mt, US$3.6 mio]).

(II) 1E101.b. Technology and information for the production of item 1C117.b (including process specifications, process parameters, processing procedures, etc.).

V. Indium-related items

(I) 3C004.a. Indium phosphide (reference customs commodity number: 2853904051).

(II) 3C004.b. Trimethyl indium (reference customs commodity number: 2931900032 [included in III (ii) above]).

(III) 3C004.c. Triethyl indium (reference customs commodity number: 2931900032 [included in III (ii) above]).

(IV) 3E004 Technology and information for the production of 3C004 (including process specifications, process parameters, processing procedures, etc.).

Export operators who export the above items shall apply for a license from the State Council’s commerce department in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items.

This announcement shall be officially implemented from the date of publication. The Export Control List of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China shall be updated simultaneously.

Ministry of Commerce General Administration of Customs

February 4, 2025

Actually, worst hit by all of the above will be Japan and Korea, who take the bulk of China’s exports under above tariff numbers.

We find it pretty lame to abuse obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as an excuse for export embargoes. Obligations, which China’s officialdom has no history of seriously following up on.

As we said before, this Chinese administration turns “Made in China” into something like a hazard warning label.


Announcement of the Working Mechanism of the Unreliable Entity List on the inclusion of PVH Group and Illumina Inc. of the United States in the Unreliable Entity List

Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism

Announcement

No. 4 of 2025

In order to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, in accordance with the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, the National Security Law of the People's Republic of China, the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China and other relevant laws, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Unreliable Entity List Regulations, the Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism has decided to include the US PVH Group and Illumina, Inc. in the Unreliable Entity List.

The above two entities violated the normal market transaction principles, interrupted normal transactions with Chinese companies, and took discriminatory measures against Chinese companies, seriously damaging the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies. The Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism will take corresponding measures against the above entities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.

Matters not covered in this announcement shall be implemented in accordance with the Unreliable Entity List Regulations.

This announcement shall take effect from the date of publication.

Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism

(Seal of the Ministry of Commerce)

February 4, 2025

PVH Group is a textile company and Ilumina is a biotech gene-sequencing company. Both from the U.S.


Announcement of the State Council Tariff Commission on imposing additional tariffs on some imported goods originating from the United States

Tax Commission Announcement No. 1 of 2025

  On February 1, 2025, the US government announced that it would impose a 10% tariff on all Chinese goods exported to the US on the grounds of fentanyl and other issues. The US's unilateral imposition of tariffs seriously violates the rules of the World Trade Organization. It is not only unhelpful in solving its own problems, but also undermines the normal economic and trade cooperation between China and the US.

  In accordance with the Tariff Law of the People's Republic of China, the Customs Law of the People's Republic of China, the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China and other laws and regulations and the basic principles of international law, and with the approval of the State Council, additional tariffs will be imposed on some imported goods originating from the United States starting from February 10, 2025. The relevant matters are as follows:

  1. A 15% tariff will be imposed on coal and liquefied natural gas. For the specific commodity range, please see Appendix 1.

  2. A 10% tariff will be imposed on crude oil, agricultural machinery, large-displacement cars and pickup trucks. See Appendix 2 for the specific range of goods.

  3. For the imported goods listed in the appendix originating from the United States, corresponding tariffs will be levied on the basis of the current applicable tariff rates. The current bonded and tax reduction and exemption policies remain unchanged, and the additional tariffs will not be reduced or exempted.

  Appendix:

1. List of goods subject to 15% additional tariff

  2. List of goods subject to 10% tariff

  State Council Tariff Commission

  February 4, 2025

Basically, 15% additional tariff on oil & gas and 10% additional tariff on agricultural machinery plus large displacement gasoline engine passenger vehicles, whether on- or off-road. All of U.S. origin.

China lashes out at Detroit and the likes of John Deere and Caterpillar.


Newsweek

China Makes Rare-Earth Discovery: 'This Changes Everything'

The high-volume reserve of rare-earth elements discovered in the Honghe region of Yunnan Province is estimated to contain 470,000 tons of rare earth elements, state media cited the China Geological Survey as saying last week.

The site is expected to become China's largest deposit of medium-to-heavy REEs, which are relatively scarce. These elements are critical for EV, jet engine, and missile components due to their ability to retain magnetic properties at high temperatures.

We discussed this matter under “Big Bluff” on 26 January 2025 and called the bluff.

First of all, the “news” is three years old. Were Newsweek on it back then?

Then, as we posted on 26 January 2025, the only feasible mining methods for the Ma’andixiang deposit in Honghe are in the Elimination Category of the Guidance Catalogue for Industrial Structure Adjustment - 2024 Edition of China’s almighty National Reform & Development Commission, formerly known as State Planning Commission.

If China would really allow mining of Ma’andixiang, it would be an act of desperation.

Readers of The Rare Earth Observer know about it. Newsweek readers won’t, ever. If it is rare earth, don’t be a media victim.

The Rare Earth Observer is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.


//Politics

Trumps Executive Orders

Unleashing American Energy

Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States: …

(b) to establish our position as the leading producer and processor of non-fuel minerals, including rare earth minerals, which will create jobs and prosperity at home, strengthen supply chains for the United States and its allies, and reduce the global influence of malign and adversarial states; …

(e) to eliminate the “electric vehicle (EV) mandate” and promote true consumer choice, which is essential for economic growth and innovation, by removing regulatory barriers to motor vehicle access; by ensuring a level regulatory playing field for consumer choice in vehicles; by terminating, where appropriate, state emissions waivers that function to limit sales of gasoline-powered automobiles; and by considering the elimination of unfair subsidies and other ill-conceived government-imposed market distortions that favor EVs over other technologies and effectively mandate their purchase by individuals, private businesses, and government entities alike by rendering other types of vehicles unaffordable; …

Sec. 3. Immediate Review of All Agency Actions that Potentially Burden the Development of Domestic Energy Resources. (a) The heads of all agencies shall review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, settlements, consent orders, and any other agency actions (collectively, agency actions) to identify those agency actions that impose an undue burden on the identification, development, or use of domestic energy resources — with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower, biofuels, critical mineral, and nuclear energy resources — or that are otherwise inconsistent with the policy set forth in section 2 of this order, including restrictions on consumer choice of vehicles and appliances.

(b) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency shall, in consultation with the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Economic Council (NEC), develop and begin implementing action plans to suspend, revise, or rescind all agency actions identified as unduly burdensome under subsection (a) of this section, as expeditiously as possible and consistent with applicable law. The head of any agency who determines that such agency does not have agency actions described in subsection (a) of this section shall submit to the Director of OMB a written statement to that effect and, absent a determination by the Director of OMB that such agency does have agency actions described in this subsection, shall have no further responsibilities under this section. ..

(d) The Secretaries of Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy, Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Chairman of CEQ, and the heads of any other relevant agencies shall undertake all available efforts to eliminate all delays within their respective permitting processes, including through, but not limited to, the use of general permitting and permit by rule. For any project an agency head deems essential for the Nation’s economy or national security, agencies shall use all possible authorities, including emergency authorities, to expedite the adjudication of Federal permits. Agencies shall work closely with project sponsors to realize the ultimate construction or development of permitted projects.

This is going to be very interesting.

Rare Element Resources

In terms of rare earths and deregulation, Rare Element Resources, majority owned by General Atomics, and their Bear Lodge Project stand to benefit in terms of permitting - if the long announced pilot separation plant should meet expectations. In anticipation REEMF’s share price has already been enjoying a phenomenal run since beginning of the year.

Rainbow Rare Earths

A longer shot would be Rainbow Rare Earths’ envisioned separation facility in Florida benefitting from de-regulation.

Energy Fuels

In terms of Energy Fuels we would not see a substantial advantage from deregulation, apart from a speedier issuance of the long overdue GWDP license extension for the White Mesa Mill.

We have some serious concerns regarding Energy Fuels which we share in the Companies section below.

Lynas

Lynas write in their quarterly:

A pathway has been identified to resolve the wastewater management challenges previously noted at the Seadrift site. Lynas is now working with the Department of Defense to assess this pathway, and alternative approaches.

We wonder what the details of this issue are. Lynas said before that there was a wastewater permitting issue, although Lynas had not even applied for a permit. That points at something serious, if it was so bad that Lynas did not even want to proceed and apply.

Anyway, the project may benefit from lighter regulation.

Other U.S. rare earth

Impact unlikely, as the vast majority of these have nothing technically/commercially feasible in hands, while a select few who could make a difference just seem to be unable to find their own backsides in the dark.

Of course, since there is a new government, the rare-earth-panhandlers and their lobbyists are out in force, sending lengthy memos to Congress in the hope of some subsistence handouts for their worthless projects.

Tiring.


Reality check

How big is the U.S. rare earth market?

Rare earth compounds

According to the statistics of the U.S. International Trade Commission, the U.S. imported from the world in 2024:

  • Rare earth compounds: 12,020 metric tons, CIF value US$146,339,411.

The Chinese export data are more detailed than the U.S. data, so we can tell you what the composition of U.S. rare earth market is:

nes = not elsewhere stated

This is it, the entire U.S. rare earth dependence on China. 9,757 t or 71.7% of the market are lanthanum and cerium products.

Without lanthanum U.S. gasoline prices at the pump would rise up to 30%, among other unpleasantries.

And without cerium Big Auto and the glas industry would run into trouble.

How to read this

The U.S. numbers differ from China’s export statistics, because:

  1. There is a time-lag for the cross Pacific Ocean shipping period. As a rule of thumb +/- 30 days, and

  2. Not all U.S. rare-earth-relevant imports originate in China.

  3. The China statistics measure the value of the goods when they pass China’s border, e.g. the ship’s railings in the loading port (FOB). The U.S. import statistics measure the value upon entry to the U.S. (CIF). There are logistics cost in-between.

  4. Often there are traders involved, whose margin increases the landed value over the originally shipped value.

Rare earth metals

According to the statistics of the U.S. International Trade Commission, the U.S. imported from the world in 2024:

  • Rare earth metals: 73.92 metric tons, CIF value US$4,408,175;

China’s rare earth metal statistics are not detailed enough either to establish what the exact items are. There are other, tedious ways of piecing this together. Perhaps we do it one of these days for these measly 74 t.

Rare earth magnets

According to the statistics of the U.S. International Trade Commission, the U.S. imported from the world in 2024::

  • Sintered samarium cobalt magnets (SmCo):

    • 10.2 million pieces, total weight 665.4 metric tons,

    • CIF value US$10,139,138 (average value per piece US$0.99)

  • Sintered NdFeB magnets:

    • 301.8 million pieces, total weight 5,750 metric tons,

    • CIF value US$222,377,896 (average value per piece US$0.74)

As we have been preaching for years, rare earth permanent magnets are the true China dependence of the U.S. in rare earth.

During better days, before things with China first went SNAFU followed by SMFUTU, we had been advocating a top-down approach, which should look like this:

  • Attend to the rare earth magnet dependency first, based on import metal. No, it would not necessarily need to be all from China;

  • Only when rare earth magnets would run smooth, attend to rare earth metal based on imported rare earth compounds;

  • Only when rare earth metals run smooth, attend to rare earth compounds, based on ores that can actually be procured domestic;

  • Only thereafter attend to rare earth mining, domestic and, if need be, offshore.

All that accompanied by well-tuned, time-limited tariffs (you don’t want to nurse bloated subsidy-addicts, but groom internationally competitive players).

Timeframe: 12-15 years.

Rare earth hopefuls

Do rare earth hopefuls plan to attend to above products at all? Nope. Too complicated. They want things simple: Go Big or Go Home.

Top-professionals at North American rare earth hopefuls want to deplete the two market-defining products lanthanum and cerium during their (conceptual) processing. They favour a product that so far has no market in the U.S. and most of the rest of the world: NdPr oxide.

Learning from others, perhaps learning from the history of their very own projects and, lo and behold, asking those in-the-know for advice would be totally Un-American.

Never mind, in case of predictable failure one can always blame China.

The status quo

Whoever waves the Star-Spangled-Banner, screams loudest and claims to have unnecessarily re-invented the wheel (and hasn’t!) is sure to receive funding pledges and grants.


Analysing China-Myanmar border trade

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