More of China's Tantrums; China arrests Foreign Visitors for RE Violations; VAC in China; Kerala Monazite Scandal; Phoenix Tailings, Lindian, and the lot.
Rare Earth 03 July 2026 #201
Note
The Rare Earth Industry Association (REIA) still seems to believe in Nigerian Princes. We don’t.
The “$400 million” mentioned actually is Nigerian Neira (~US$275,000)
The 18,000 t capacity is for Heavy Mineral Sands, containing some Monazite, not remotely rare earths processing.
We’ll happily accept if proven wrong.
Whistleblowing
On the crossing of Fuzhou Road and Jiangxi Road in Shanghai, a stone throw from the Bund, there is the art-deco Jianshe Bulding, just next to the pre-revolution Central Police Headquarters on 185 Fuzhou Road, erected in 1933.
Post revolution the Central Police Station served the Shanghai Public Security Bureau and later also began housing the Shanghai Municipal State Security Bureau, the branch of the MSS in Beijing.
To the left of the center driveway of the former Central Police Station building you see an archway entrance. There used to be a letterbox. That is where concerned comrades could drop their anonymous reports about anti-social(ist) and counter-revolutionary activities.
Nowadays such letterboxes are no longer needed. These reports are made online, for example on the website of China’s Ministry of State Security.
Or now, also on MOFCOM’s website.
MOFCOM weighs in
China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has begun offering a reporting website for individuals or organisations, offering a reward for whistleblowing on:
Unauthorized export of dual-use strategic minerals;
Exporting strategic mineral dual-use items beyond the scope, conditions, and validity period specified in the export license;
Exporting strategic mineral dual-use items that are prohibited from export;
Circumventing the licensing of dual-use items related to strategic minerals for export by modifying or dismantling them into parts or components;
Circumventing export controls on dual-use strategic minerals by circumventing third countries (regions);
Illegally transferring controlled strategic mineral-related technologies abroad through trade exports and intellectual property licensing, investment, exchange, donation, exhibition, display, testing, assistance, teaching, joint research and development, employment or hiring, consulting, etc.
Knowingly providing agency, freight, postal, customs declaration, third-party e-commerce trading platform and financial services to exporters engaged in illegal export activities of strategic mineral dual-use items;
Instigating or assisting exporters, importers, or end-users to circumvent export control regulations on dual-use strategic minerals and commit illegal acts;
Exporters violate regulations by engaging in transactions with importers or end-users listed in the control list;
The exporter knew or should have known that there might be risks listed in Article 12 of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China for goods, technologies and services related to strategic minerals other than those listed in the export control list and temporary control items, but did not apply for a license from the Ministry of Commerce;
Domestic importers and end-users violate their commitments to the Ministry of Commerce;
Violating regulations by accepting or promising to accept requests from foreign governments for visits, on-site inspections, or other matters related to export controls on dual-use strategic minerals;
Other acts that violate laws and regulations on export control of dual-use strategic minerals.
“Other” acts, the famous “qi ta de” (其他的=other), universally present in all Chinese laws and regulations. An infinitely stretchable rubber term, which puts everyone and everything at the pleasure/leisure of China’s administration. And should the one or the other law or civil right stand in the way, remember that China top administrators serve concurrently also as top CPC officials.
By definition, the CPC is above the constitution and thereby also above the law. So the option is, to act either on behalf of the administration or on behalf of the CPC. Either one works. Problem, if any, solved.
To his credit, while folding scattered, decades-old regulations into comprehensive & comprehensible laws, the General Secretary continues formulating party-internal rules and frameworks, holding the CPC, its officials and members to tight sets of rules, supposedly limiting the enormous leeway and highly potential abuse of qi ta de, “other”.
//Politics
China defends critical minerals export controls after G7 statement
China defended its export control measures on critical mineral supplies and urged the Group of Seven nations to respect market economy principles and international trading rules rather favouring "small cliques", its foreign ministry said on Thursday.
China and market economy principles do not mix. The Chinese government uses all macro tools at its disposal to manipulate markets and product flows, as the state-owned Socialist non-market economy and the real-world Darwinist market economy do not co-exist well. China is currently in the process of figuring that one out the hard way.
And here the pinnacle of BS has been successfully scaled again:
"The aim is to better safeguard world peace and regional stability and to fulfill international obligations related to non-proliferation," he added, urging the G7 leaders to cease "imposing rules of small cliques" that undermine the international economic and trade order.
“Better safeguard world peace” by withholding Yttrium? Chinese origin will be replaced, of course, that is all. How does this safeguard world peace?
And would China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs please clarify in detail which exact “international obligations related to non-proliferation” it intends to fulfill?
China does not classify rare earths as means of weapon production
According to our analysis China classifies rare earths expressly as not as dual-use for potential use in weaponry, but for “other” national security factors (here you have “qi ta de”, “other”, again - covering everything under the sun).
This being so, China’s dual-use export licensing rules for rare earths have absolutely nothing to do with
better safeguard world peace and regional stability and to fulfill international obligations related to non-proliferation
Dual-use export licensing for rare earths has everything to do with a unilateral, China-only policy that has no roots in whatever international obligations.
Rare earth is just a blackmail tool to exert power - for a brief period.
The Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 23 of 2026 the decision to add 10 U.S. entities to the export control list
[Issuing Authority] Bureau of Safety and Control
[Document Number] Announcement No. 23 of 2026 issued by the Ministry of Commerce
[Date of Issuance] June 22, 2026In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China, and in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, it has been decided to add 10 U.S. entities, including AVIC Corporation, to the Export Control List (see Annex), and to take the following measures:
I. Exporters are prohibited from exporting dual-use items to the aforementioned 10 entities, and any organization or individual from any country or region is prohibited from transferring or providing dual-use items originating in China to the aforementioned entities; any ongoing related export activities must be immediately ceased.
II. In special circumstances where export is truly necessary, the exporter shall submit an application to the Ministry of Commerce.
This announcement shall take effect from the date of its publication.
Attachment: List of Export Controls (June 22, 2026)
Ministry of Commerce
June 22, 2026
appendix
Export Control List
(June 22, 2026)
Aveox, Inc.
Address: 2265A Ward Ave., Simi Valley, CA, USA
Postal code: 93065
Common name: AVEOX
Red Cat Holdings, Inc.
Address: 2800 S West Temple St., Unite 2, South Salt Lake, UT, USA
Postal code: 84115
Common name: Red Cat
Teal Drones, Inc.
Address: 2800 S West Temple St., Unite 2, South Salt Lake, UT, USA
Postal code: 84115
Common names: Teal Drones, iDrone
IMSAR, LLC (USA)
Address: 940 S 2000 W#140 Springville, UT, USA
Postal code: 84663
Common name: IMSAR
Jaia Robotics, Inc.
Address: 22 Burnside St, Bristol, RI, USA
Postal code: 02809
Common name: Jaia Robotics
Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp.
Address: 10 Longs Peak Drive, Broomfield, CO, USA
Postal code: 80301
Common name: Ball Aerospace, Space & Mission Systems business of BAE Systems
Oshkosh Defense, LLC
Address: 2307 Oregon Street, Oshkosh, WI, USA
Postal code: 54902
Common name: Oshkosh Defense
L3 Harris Maritime Services, Inc.
Address: 3835 E Princess Anne Rd, Norfolk, VA, USA
Postal code: 23502
Common name: L3Harris Maritime
MP Materials Corp.
Address: 1700 S Pavilion Center Drive Eighth Floor, Las Vegas, NV, USA
Postal code: 89135
Common name: MP Materials
USA Rare Earth, Inc.
Address: 100 W Airport Rd, Stillwater, OK, USA
Postal code: 74075
Common names: USAR, USARE
China reciprocates for the US having put companies like BYD and Alibaba on its entity list. Of course western media like to overlook such details. By definition China must be the aggressor. It must not be, that China is merely reciprocating unilateral acts of a disconnected US administration.
Soon we’ll see Walmart and Disneyland added to these kindergarten lists.
The Ministry of Commerce announced in Announcement No. 27 of 2026 that 20 Japanese entities will be added to the export control list
The Ministry of Commerce announced in Announcement No. 27 of 2026 that 20 Japanese entities will be added to the export control list.
[Issuing Authority] Bureau of Safety and Control
[Document Number] Announcement No. 27 of 2026 issued by the Ministry of Commerce
[Date of Issuance] June 29, 2026In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China, and in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, it has been decided to add 20 Japanese entities, including the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), which are involved in enhancing Japan’s military capabilities, to the export control list (see Annex), and to take the following measures:
I. Exporters are prohibited from exporting dual-use items to the aforementioned 20 entities, and foreign organizations and individuals are prohibited from transferring or providing dual-use items originating in the People’s Republic of China to the aforementioned 20 entities; any ongoing related activities must be immediately ceased.
II. In special circumstances where export is truly necessary, the exporter shall submit an application to the Ministry of Commerce.
This announcement shall take effect from the date of its publication.
Attachment: List of Export Controlled Enterprises (June 29, 2026)
Ministry of Commerce
June 29, 2026
appendix
Export Control List
(June 29, 2026)
National Institute for Defense Studies
Address: 5-1 Ichigaya Honmura-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 162-8808
Ground Systems Research CenterAddress:
2-9-54 Fuchinobe, Chuo-ku, Sagamihara City, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan
Postal code: 252-0206
Naval Systems Research Center
Address: 2-2-1 Nakameguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 153-0061
Air Systems Research Center
Address: 1-2-10 Sakae-cho, Tachikawa City, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 190-8533
NIKKO TOKKI Co., Ltd.
Address: 1005 Osaki West Tower, 1-11-1 Osaki, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan (Gateway City Osaki West Tower)
Postal code: 141-0032
Nikko-YPK SHOJI Co., Ltd.
Address: 10th Floor, Gateway City Osaki West Tower, 1-11-1 Osaki, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 141-0032
Mitsubishi Electric Defense and Space Technologies Corporation
Address: 1-15-9 Osaki, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 141-0032
Mitsubishi Electric Software Corporation
Address: 29th Floor, South Wing, World Trade Center Tower, 2-4-1 Hamamatsucho, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 105-5129
Mitsubishi Electric Engineering Company, Limited
Address: Terrace, Mitacho, 5-34-2 Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 108-0014
Mitsubishi Precision Company, Limited
Address: 8th Floor, Shibaura Crystal Shinagawa, 1-6-41 Konan, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 108-0075
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ocean Technology Co., Ltd.
Address: 6-53 Tsukuba-cho, Isahaya City, Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan
Postal code: 854-0065
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Sagami High-tech, Ltd.
Address: 3000 Tana, Chuo-ku, Sagamihara City, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan
Postal code: 252-5293
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Logistics Technology Co., Ltd
Address: 1200 Higashitanaka, Komaki City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan
Postal code: 485-0826
KOWA KOGYO, Ltd.
Address: 8th Floor, Dejima Asahi Life Aoki Building, 1-14 Dejima-cho, Nagasaki City, Japan
Postal code: 850-0862
MHI Special Vehicles Parts Supply & Technical Service Co., Ltd.
Address: 4-3 Katamachi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan (3rd Floor, Akeboshi SHK Building)
Postal code: 160-0001
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Marine Technology Co., Ltd.
Address: 1-1 Hisanoura-cho, Nagasaki City, Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan
Postal code: 850-8610
KGM Co., Ltd. (Kawajyu Gifu Manufacturing Co., Ltd.)
Address: 1st Floor, Kawasaki-cho, Kakamigahara City, Gifu Prefecture, Japan
Postal code: 504-0971
NIPPI Corporation (Japan Aircraft Corporation)
Address: 3175 Showa-cho, Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan
Zip code: 236-8540
Fortunio Co., Ltd.
Address: 2-16-19 Senzoku, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Postal code: 152-0012
Aoki Seimitsu Kogyo Co., Ltd.
Address: 3-38-12 Zama, Kawaguchi City, Saitama Prefecture, Japan
Postal code: 333-0816
We count 26 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries companies in China alone, including those, that are contributing to massively China’s power industry, and those which keep China’s steel industry running.
China is steadily inflicting damage, including on itself, like an elephant on the loose in a china shop — all in service of its leaders' hegemonic ambitions.
Putting things into perspective
Japan's tilt toward remilitarization is a reaction, not an action: to China's Document No. 9 declaration of ideological war on Western democracy (issued just at the time when Shinzo Abe entered office as Japan’s PM), its aggression and militarisation in the South China Sea, and its pressure on Taiwan, an economy deeply intertwined with Japan's.
China understands perfectly well that Taiwan primarily seeks to preserve the status quo — China is the one manufacturing drama, rumor and subversion because China is the one dissatisfied with that status quo.
It's China flying joint bomber patrols with Russia near Japanese territory and sending warships to remote Japanese islands — not the reverse.
Yet Red China blames Japan for wanting to defend itself against uncalled-for aggression.
Even the most one-track-minded Communist concrete-head will understand, that aggression against Taiwan will cause a concerns in Japan. Consequently, one could assume that China purposefully provoked the entire conflict with Japan, in order to do, what China wants to do anyway
Japan Rare Earth Push risks Environmental Harm for Uncertain Returns
This summer, a delegation including Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), major trading houses, and the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) is scheduled to assess heavy rare earth potential at the Tanbreez deposit in southern Greenland during July and August. Separately, Japan in early 2026 carried out a world-first trial, led by the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC), to lift rare-earth-rich mud from roughly 6,000 meters below the surface near Minamitorishima.
Both efforts are framed as steps toward reducing dependence on China, which dominates global rare earth supply and has tightened export controls. The strategic logic is understandable. But the environmental and economic case deserves far harder scrutiny than it has received.
A radioactive complication in the Arctic
In Greenland, rare earth deposits are frequently bound up with radioactive elements such as uranium and thorium — one reason Greenland's parliament restricted uranium-bearing mining in 2021, stalling the Kvanefjeld project. Extraction in such a setting raises legitimate concerns about toxic tailings and the contamination of water sources in an already stressed Arctic ecosystem. Building mining infrastructure across carbon-rich permafrost carries its own climate risks.
The practical obstacles are equally severe. Independent analysts, including Wood Mackenzie, note that Greenland has no operating rare earth mines, minimal infrastructure, a tiny labor pool, and capital requirements that make projects uncompetitive against Canada, Australia, and the United States. More than a decade after exploration began, not a single commercial mine is in production.
We wonder why WoodMackenzie do not bring up, that Greenland’s rare earths rest in complex silicate minerals, notably Eudialyte (see also Leading Edge in the Companies section). In spite of decades of research, no-one ever produced separated, ready-to-use rare earth oxides from any Eudialyte resource.
Japan Inc. should actually know that from the Toyotsu Kipawa debacle in Canada 11 years ago.
This fact turns Greenland’s much hyped rare earths at Kvanefjeld and Kingslerne (Tanbreez) into worthless rubble.
Japan’s Rare Earth Move in Mongolia sparks Chinese Backlash
Last month, Mongolian Foreign Minister Batmunkh Battsetseg held a closed-door meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and stated, “As a special strategic partner, we want to further concretize cooperation with Japan in the future.” Japan responded by expressing its willingness to actively cooperate in the expansion project of Genghis Khan International Airport. In response, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi rushed to Ulaanbaatar and successively met with Mongolia’s president, prime minister, and foreign minister.
China views the “concretization of cooperation” mentioned by the Mongolian foreign minister after the talks with Japan last month as related to rare earth supply. Mongolia is rich in rare earth resources. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates Mongolia’s rare earth reserves at 31 million tons, ranking second in the world after China (44 million tons).
There are only two ways are earths can leave Mongolia for Japan: Through Russia, or, most likely, through China. Even if by air. We leave it to the eyes of the beholder, how likely either option is in view of current tensions.
In terms of the quality of Mongolian rare earth deposits, they seem very bastnaesity, i.e. very high in La and Ce, for example Khotgor:
To make air-transport from Mongolia to Japan worth the while, the entire mining, processing and separation would need to happen in Mongolia. It would be very unlikely, that either Russia or China assist with supplying large quantities of acids and extractants.
