MOFCOM Publishes Barrage of RE-Regulations; US-Govt's latest RE Follies; China to centralise RE Purchasing?; USAR's Strange Acquisition; GMA Sign Up Rio Tinto and the lot
Rare Earth 9 October 2025 #183
Oct 09, 2025
∙ Paid
Correction
We found a mistake in our previous post. Regarding the MTM content in our previous post we hereby correct:
The Pomme project option deadline was 22 February 2025. MTM did not pay up. So the option should have lapsed.
But Geomega granted an extension for the Pomme option until 21 October 2025.
Thanks to Geomega for prompt responses to our questions.
Note
US attrition warfare to conquer rare earths
In its rare earths craze, after having created a subsidy-dependent rare earth Frankenstein, the current US government now considers investing in one of the deadest deadbeat deposits in the world (we pointedly do not call it a “rare earth” deposit). Read our take on this cunning idea below.
The US Exim Bank also wants to throw US-taxpayer money at an Australian company, so that the Australian company can perform its binding offtake contract with China. And the recipient dares to call this “Strategic Alignment with U.S. Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative” and mocks the US.
Roaring laughter in Beijing.
Read more in the Companies section below.
Extraterritorial application of China’s dual use licensing of 7 12 rare earths
China’s MOFCOM came up with an additional regulations covering the downstream of dual-use licensed exports. Extraterritorial application of Chinese export restrictions down to the very last foreign user in the related value chain.
The number of dual-use license controlled items increases to 12 by 8 November 2025.
Also by 8 November 2025 it is game over for the uncontrolled export of any equipment and auxiliaries for the mining, benefication and separation of rare earths. All will require dual-use export licenses. Chinese people assisting foreigners in rare earth abroad will be in hot water.
We are surprised that the ammomium sulphate and magnesium sulphate needed for ion-adsorption clay in-situ leaching are not (yet) on the list. It is a bit difficult, as Brazil, for example, imports more than 5 million t of AmSul fertiliser per year from China. And South East Asia is importing hundred thousands of tons per year of magnesium sulphate for rubber plantations.
Basically, these announcements are a pie in the face of all the foolish “NdPr-only” rare earth hopefuls. Any rare earth project that does not turn out the full range of separated lanthanides plus yttrium has become useless.
Then China re-iterates technology export restrictions for rare earths and adds one item (thanks to our reader for pointing this one out).
Read more below.
“Useful idiots”
Some young, obviously inexperienced know-it-alls travel to China in order to declare the West being uninvestable right after. China’s propaganda machine is jubilant.
Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin and later Joseph Stalin used to call such people “useful idiots”.
And Bloomberg is celebrating these visionaries. See below.
Strange acquisition
There has been a strange acquisition in the rare earth world, valuing the money-losing target at almost 20 years of revenue.
We have a closer look at the who is who in the Companies section below.
We would have loved to bring you more content on things like MP’s revenue recognition and Neo’s quarterly, but current events have precedence.
A bit off topic - the BHP ban
Late come, early go
In the 1980’s China had central state-owned enterprises for all parts of the China economy. Imports and exports were handled by foreign trade subsidiaries of these “work units”.
The principal foreign trade work units such as steel, machinery, equipment and chemicals all shared the same negotiation building, referred to by its location in the west of Beijing as “Erligou”. Adjacent and connected were the office buildings of the work units, guarded and strictly off-limits to visitors.
The negotiation building was a smaller building on the right side of Minmetals Head Office
In the lobby of the negotiation building there was an appointment book that openly displayed which visitor company would meet which work unit on what day at what time. If you were late you would forego your appointment. Hence, leaning on the name Erligou: Late come, early go.
The negotiation rooms had long tables and typically could sit 6-8 people on either side. Visitors would always be placed on the left side of the room, at the end of which was an air conditioner mounted in the window, gently blowing ice-cold air towards the tea-drinking visitors kidneys in the dry Beijing summer heat - which would conveniently build up pressure on the visitors side. And in the brutal Beijing winter cold all would shiver together in the unheated rooms, the visitors in their coats and the comrades under multiple layers of Mao suits.
On the work unit’s side there would be a line of additional chairs lined up against the wall.
Typically the number of negotiators on the work unit’s side would match or exceed the number of visitors. The comrades would introduce themselves with name cards containing only names, company, address, a company switchboard telephone number and a telex address - but no titles. Often there was a elderly comrade who would not be introduced, sitting on one of the chairs against the wall, diligently taking notes.
All would pretend not to speak English, except for an often young translator among the comrades. This in order to win time for thinking of a response.
You also had to assume that one of the comrades would be fluent in the visitors’ home country language and quietly take notes of the whispers among the visitors.
On the import side these central work units would negotiate the purchase of materials, which according to the State Planning Commission were undersupplied domestically during the current 5-year plan.
Why do we tell you all this? Because Xi Jin Ping Thought in the New Era is a leap back to the old era.
The BHP ban
Actually, globally speaking, there used to be a yearly contract for quantities and prices for iron ore for all principal steel making nations, typically negotiated once per year. This was incredibly helpful for iron ore miners and also for steel companies, as it gave all partners financial planning certainty.
Consumers would typically allocate 80% +/-10% of demand to the yearly contract and ca. 20% to spot purchases of excess quantities from global iron ore miners.
Simple logic has it that under such conditions the spot price would always be lower than the contract price, unless there was a serious supply-shortage.
In 2010 CISA, the China Iron & Steel Association, abandoned the yearly fixing and opted for only spot purchasing by its members on grounds of the spot market being continuously cheaper than contract prices. They reckoned there was a continued oversupply situation.
A logical error and shortly after iron ore spot prices zoomed skywards, because every steel company in China was trying to buy on its own for the needed arrival times at China’s congested ports.
The abolishment of these global yearly agreements made China, being the by far largest consumer, a play-ball of the commodity market.
Back to the roots
In 2022 China set up China Mineral Resources Group Co., Ltd. (CMRG) in Xi Jin Ping’s new capital of Xiong’An. The state-owned company currently represents and negotiates ca. 50% of China’s projected iron ore import demand. And it is this company that issued a ban on BHP iron ore purchases. Chinese steel companies not organised under CMRG’s umbrella are expected to follow suit - or else….
Why bother?
Iron ore prices and steel prices are moving in opposite directions and China needs to break the price trend in iron ore as the overproduction of steel is basically out of control: By rule of thumb you can’t run a blast oxygen furnace (BOF) below 60-70% of capacity utilisation.
The rare earth relevance
China may want to centralise the procurement of foreign rare earth raw materials as well. In seaborne imports or rare earth raw materials so far Shenghe Resources are the dominant buyer, but owing to Shenghe’s self-interest downstream and competition with the other two big ones they don’t qualify as a somewhat neutral third party.
Same goes for China Rare Earth Group’s Myanmar imports.
Not everything the central government wants is also implemented. Apart from Shenghe, China Rare Earth Group and China Northern Rare Earth Group may also not be convinced that centralisation may be a good idea.
But the central government is somewhat likely to try.
[Issuing Unit] Safety and Regulatory Bureau [Issuing Document Number] Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 61 of 2025 [Issuing Date] October 9, 2025
To safeguard national security and interests, in accordance with the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, and other relevant laws and regulations, and with the approval of the State Council of China, we have decided to take the following export control measures:
1. Overseas organizations and individuals (hereinafter referred to as “overseas designated export operators”) must obtain a dual-use item export license issued by the Ministry of Commerce of China before exporting the following items to countries and regions outside of China:
(1) Items listed in Part II of Annex 1 to this Announcement that contain, integrate or are mixed with items listed in Part I of Annex 1 to this Announcement that are manufactured overseas and that originate in China, and the value of the items listed in Part I of Annex 1 to this Announcement accounts for 0.1% or more of the value of the items listed in Part II of Annex 1 manufactured overseas;
(2) Items listed in Annex 1 of this Announcement that are produced overseas using technologies originating in China for rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, or rare earth secondary resource recycling;
(3) Items listed in Annex 1 to this Announcement originating in China.
2. In principle, export applications to overseas military users, as well as export applications to importers and end-users listed on the export control list and watch list (including their subsidiaries, branches and other branches in which they hold a 50% or more stake) will not be approved.
3. In principle, export applications for products that are or may be used for the following end uses will not be approved:
(1) Designing, developing, producing, and using weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
(2) terrorist purposes;
(3) Military use or enhancement of military potential.
4. Export applications for the ultimate purpose of research and development, and production of 14-nanometer and below logic chips or 256-layer and above memory chips, as well as production equipment, testing equipment and materials for manufacturing the above-mentioned process semiconductors, or research and development of artificial intelligence with potential military applications will be approved on a case-by-case basis.
5. For export applications where the end use is for humanitarian relief such as emergency medical treatment, response to public health emergencies, and natural disaster relief, overseas export operators do not need to apply for export licenses for dual-use items. However, they should report to the Ministry of Commerce of China via email (jingwaibaogao@mofcom.gov.cn) no later than 10 working days after the export and commit that the relevant items will not be used for purposes that endanger China’s national security and interests.
VI. Overseas designated export operators applying for export licenses for dual-use items must submit relevant documents in accordance with Article 16 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items and the requirements of the Ministry of Commerce of China’s dual-use item export license approval system. The relevant documents shall be in Chinese. The approval system website is: http://ecomp.mofcom.gov.cn.
Overseas designated export operators may submit application documents directly or entrust enterprises, intermediary service agencies, chambers of commerce, associations, etc. located in China to handle the application. The relevant intermediary service agencies, chambers of commerce, and associations must be independent legal entities or unincorporated organizations that can independently bear legal liability.
If a specific overseas export operator is unable to determine whether the items to be exported are items that require export license application in accordance with the provisions of this Announcement, it may inquire via email (jingwaizixun@mofcom.gov.cn).
VII. Domestic export operators exporting dual-use items listed in Part 1 of Annex 1 to this Announcement shall fill in the final destination country or region as required when declaring exports, and issue a “Compliance Notice” to overseas importers and end-users in accordance with the compliance guidelines attached to this Announcement.
Overseas export operators shall, in accordance with the compliance guidelines attached to this Announcement, issue a “Compliance Notice” to the next recipient when transferring or exporting items controlled by this Announcement.
8. Sections 1 (I) and 1 (II) of this Announcement shall come into effect on December 1, 2025. Section 1 (III) of this Announcement shall come into effect on the date of publication.
This means that the 7 rare earths or anything that contains or is made of them
Samarium
Scandium
Dysprosium
Terbium
Gadolinium
Lutetium
Yttrium
under dual-use export controls, after licensed export from China can only be passed to a third party abroad if a dual-use license has been obtained from MOFCOM in China by the third party - and a letter of compliance.
Post publication MOFCOM added
Holmium
Erbium
Thulium
Europium
Ytterbium
to the dual-use items list, but valid only from 8 November 2025 (see below).
If whatever this third party manufactures abroad contains more than 0.1% of any of the 12 rare earths above and passes its resulting product to a fourth party, again a dual-use license from MOFCOM will be required - and a letter of compliance.
And so on throughout the production chain.
This even applies to research laboratory quantities peddled by the likes of American Elements.
All that in Chinese language - imperial arrogance?
A practical example:
In an ideal wonder-world MP Materials will start producing NdFeB blanks as well as finished NdFeB magnets.
For the finished NdFeB magnets MP want to sell to GM, MP will need dysprosium, gadolinium and terbium alloys, all of which are unobtainium outside China.
MP will (try) placing corresponding orders to China and will do a Full Monty so that the alloys get dual-use export license clearance.
Since the alloys will likely be in excess of 0.1% of the weight of the resulting magnets that MP want to pass to GM, GM will need to acquire a dual-use license from MOFCOM and submit a letter of compliance - in Chinese, of course. Also GM will need to do the Full Monty.
If MP do not comply, there will be no more alloys from China for MP.
If GM do not comply, it will have sold its last car in China, and, worse, it may lose all China-made components (combustion engine vehicles are still around 35% of NdFeB magnet demand, by the way).
The pinnacle of extraterritorial application of domestic law has been scaled. The US sanctions regime against everyone & sundry looks pale in comparison.
We see three good elements in this:
At least theoretically it opens the doors for importers-stockists of record to try and get material, even if they can’t pinpoint exactly who they will sell to for what purpose at the time of purchase. The wholesale-retail customer abroad would need to obtain a MOFCOM dual-use license, then, and submit a letter of compliance.
We are not at the end of rare earth dual-use licensing. The 7 elements are only the beginning and there will be add-ons. 5 more rare earths have been added.
Any industrialised economy absolutely requires free and unhindered access to ALL rare earths and its downstream products - regardless of the application. It has become essential to build separation facilities that separate ALL rare earths, not only the much hyped “NdPr” in destination countries: at the very least in Korea, Japan, US, India and the EU. (Japan will be the fastest, as it “only” needs to scale-up. The EU is not even on the floor, it is subterranean. With its straightjacket of regulation and lack of permanent disposal facilities for inevitably occurring radioactive waste the EU is suffocating the embryo of attempted rare earth production).
China does not want to completely disable its rare earth exports, yet.
Dual purpose
In our observation all and any Chinese regulation is never designed to serve a singular purpose. It is always designed to serve multiple purposes.
By disabling the US Department of War supply chain in rare earths the US can no longer produce important weaponry at will. It will need to conserve inventory, which means ever less weaponry will be available for the war in Ukraine.
This serves China’s only relevant friend in the world: Russia.
Trade negotiation leverage
China is very conscious to retain the moral high ground. The regulations are based on “domestic law” and obligations under (undefined) international agreements.
Making the regulations part of trade negotiations would imply that China’s integrity was for sale. It is not going to happen, in our view.
The timing
The timing of the regulations was perfect, because the US were the aggressor with the high import tariffs. Without this, China implementing such regulations would have made China like the bad guy. Instead China looked like defending itself against aggression.
Our take
The regulations were not a good idea, as now it has become imperative for the West to build an own rare earth industry, complete. But, as you can see below, the needed equipment will not be made available from China.
In escalation China can use the power it wields over Lynas, VAC and Neo, all of whom it can hurt really badly.
[Issuing Unit] Security and Control Bureau [Issuing Document Number] Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 57 of 2025 [Issuing Date] October 9, 2025
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China, and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, and to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, with the approval of the State Council, it has been decided to implement export controls on the following items:
1. 1C909 Holmium-Related Items
(1) 1C909.a. Holmium metal, holmium-containing alloys, and related products:
1. Holmium metal (reference tariff number: 28053019).
2. Alloys containing holmium:
a. Holmium copper alloy;
b. Magnesium-holmium alloy;
c. Holmium-iron alloy.
3. Target containing holmium:
a. Holmium target;
b. Holmium copper alloy target.
4. Permanent magnetic materials containing holmium.
5. Crystalline materials containing holmium.
6. Magnetic refrigeration materials containing holmium.
7. Magnetostrictive materials containing holmium.
(ii) 1C909.b. Holmium oxide and its mixtures.
(iii) 1C909.c. Compounds containing holmium and mixtures thereof.
II. 1C910 Erbium-Related Items
(1) 1C910.a. Erbium metal, erbium-containing alloys, and related products:
1. Erbium metal (reference tariff number: 28053019).
2. Alloys containing erbium:
a. Erbium aluminum alloy;
b. [Reserved].
3. Erbium-containing targets:
a. Erbium target;
b. [Reserved].
4. Crystalline materials containing erbium.
5. Optical fiber materials containing erbium.
6. Erbium-containing hydrogen storage materials.
7. Erbium-containing ceramic materials.
(ii) 1C910.b. Erbium oxide and its mixtures.
(iii) 1C910.c. Compounds containing erbium and mixtures thereof.
III. 1C911 Thulium-Related Items
(1) 1C911.a. Thulium metal, thulium-containing alloys, and related products:
1. Thulium metal (reference tariff number: 28053019).
2. Target containing thulium:
a. Thulium target;
b. [Reserved].
3. Crystalline materials containing thulium.
4. Luminescent materials containing thulium.
(ii) 1C911.b. Thulium oxide and its mixtures.
(iii) 1C911.c. Thulium-containing compounds and mixtures thereof.
IV. 1C912 Europium-Related Items
(1) 1C912.a. Europium metal, europium-containing alloys, and related products:
1. Europium metal (reference tariff number: 28053019).
(iii) 1C913.c. Ytterbium-containing compounds and mixtures thereof.
illustrate:
1. Alloys controlled by Items 1C909.a.2, 1C910.a.2, and 1C912.a.2 include alloys in the form of ingots, blocks, bars, wires, sheets, rods, plates, tubes, granules, and powders.
2. Target materials regulated by Items 1C909.a.3, 1C910.a.3, 1C911.a.2, 1C912.a.3, and 1C913.a.2 include those in the form of sheets, tubes, etc.
3. Permanent magnetic materials controlled by Item 1C909.a.4 include magnets or magnetic powder.
4. Oxides, compounds and mixtures thereof controlled under Items 1C909, 1C910, 1C911, 1C912 and 1C913 include but are not limited to powders and other forms.
Export operators who wish to export the above-mentioned items shall apply for a license from the State Council’s commerce department in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items.
Exporters are responsible for the authenticity of declared goods and must strengthen the identification of export items. For controlled items, they must indicate “dual-use item” in the remarks column of the declaration form and specify the dual-use item export control code. For non-controlled items with similar parameters, indicators, and performance, they must indicate “not controlled item” in the remarks column of the declaration form and provide the specific parameters and indicators. If there are doubts about the completeness, accuracy, and authenticity of the above information, customs will question it in accordance with the law, and export goods will not be released during the questioning period.
This Announcement will take effect on November 8, 2025. The Export Control List of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China will be updated simultaneously.
Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs
October 9, 2025
“3. Permanent magnetic materials controlled by Item 1C909.a.4 include magnets or magnetic powder”: This is possibly affecting Neo Performance Materials.
[Issuing Unit] Security and Regulatory Bureau [Issuing Document Number] Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 56 of 2025 [Issuing Date] October 9, 2025
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China, and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, and to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, with the approval of the State Council, it has been decided to implement export controls on the following items:
1. 2B902 rare earth production and processing equipment
(I) 2B902.a. Centrifugal extraction equipment for rare earth production and processing.
(II) 2B902.b. Intelligent continuous impurity removal and precipitation equipment for ionic rare earth ores with a daily leachate processing capacity of 5,000 m³ or more.
(III) 2B902.c. Rare earth roasting kilns having all of the following characteristics:
1. Size range: Φ1.8×20 m~Φ4.6×80 m;
2. Lining materials inside the kiln shell, including graphite bricks, high-alumina bricks, mullite bricks and other materials that are resistant to concentrated sulfuric acid, hydrofluoric acid corrosion and heat;
3. The reaction temperature is less than or equal to 850°C.
(IV) 2B902.d. Extraction tanks with a mixing chamber volume of 0.5 to 14.2 m³ for rare earth separation and purification.
(5) 2B902.e. Ion adsorption equipment for rare earth separation and purification.
(VI) 2B902.f. Precipitation crystallization reactors for rare earth elements with a reactor volume of 10 to 50 m³.
(VII) 2B902.g. Parts and components for items controlled under 2B902.f:
(XVIII) 2B902.r. Parts and components for items controlled by 2B902.q:
1. Valve;
2. Hydrogen busbar.
(19) 2B902.s. Rare earth permanent magnet jet mills having all of the following characteristics:
1. Particle size is less than or equal to 5μm;
2. The total powder yield is greater than or equal to 99%;
3. The oxygen content in the system is less than or equal to 80ppm.
(20) 2B902.t. Rare earth permanent magnet forming presses with a magnetic field intensity of 1.5 T or greater.
(21) 2B902.u. Automatic hot pressing equipment for rare earth permanent magnets.
(XXII) 2B902.v. Cold isostatic pressing machines for rare earth permanent magnets, not controlled by item 2B104 (reference tariff number: 84798310).
(XXIII) 2B902.w. Any of the following rare earth permanent magnet vacuum sintering furnaces with a cooling time of 20 minutes or less, a heating temperature of 500-1200°C, and a temperature uniformity within ±3°C at 1000°C:
1. Single horizontal sintering furnace;
2. Continuous vacuum sintering furnace;
3. Vertical sintering furnace.
(24) 2B902.x. Equipment for processing rare earth magnetic materials:
Export operators who wish to export the above-mentioned items shall apply for a license from the State Council’s commerce department in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items.
Exporters are responsible for the authenticity of declared goods and must strengthen the identification of export items. For controlled items, they must indicate “dual-use item” in the remarks column of the declaration form and specify the dual-use item export control code. For non-controlled items with similar parameters, indicators, and performance, they must indicate “not controlled item” in the remarks column of the declaration form and provide the specific parameters and indicators. If there are doubts about the completeness, accuracy, and authenticity of the above information, customs will question it in accordance with the law, and export goods will not be released during the questioning period.
This Announcement will take effect on November 8, 2025. The Export Control List of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China will be updated simultaneously.
Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs
[Issuing Unit] Safety and Regulatory Bureau [Issuing Document Number] Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 62 of 2025 [Issuing Date] October 9, 2025
To safeguard national security and interests, and in accordance with the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, and other relevant laws and regulations, and with the approval of the State Council, it has been decided to implement export controls on rare earth-related technologies and other items. The relevant provisions are as follows:
1. The following items may not be exported without permission:
(1) Technologies related to rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and recycling and utilization of rare earth secondary resources, and their carriers; (Control Code: 1E902.a)
(2) Technologies related to the assembly, commissioning, maintenance, repair, and upgrading of production lines for rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and recycling of rare earth secondary resources. (Control Code: 1E902.b)
If the exporter is aware that non-controlled goods, technologies, or services will be used for or substantially contribute to overseas rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, or rare earth secondary resource recycling activities, they must apply for a dual-use export license from the Ministry of Commerce before exporting, in accordance with Article 12 of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China and Article 14 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. They may not be provided without permission.
The meaning and scope of “rare earths,” “smelting and separation,” “metal smelting,” and “rare earth secondary resources” as used in this announcement shall be governed by the relevant provisions of the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Rare Earths.” “Magnetic material manufacturing” technology, as used in this announcement, refers to the manufacturing technology for samarium-cobalt, neodymium-iron-boron, and cerium magnets. The technology and its supporting materials referred to in this announcement include technology-related data, such as design drawings, process specifications, process parameters, processing procedures, and simulation data.
2. The export operators referred to in this announcement include Chinese citizens, legal persons and unincorporated organizations, as well as all natural persons, legal persons and unincorporated organizations within the territory of China.
For the purpose of this Announcement, export refers to the transfer of the controlled items listed in this Announcement from the territory of the People’s Republic of China to foreign countries, or the provision of the controlled items to foreign organizations or individuals within or outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China, including trade export and transfer or provision through any means such as intellectual property licensing, investment, exchange, donation, exhibition, display, inspection, testing, assistance, teaching, joint research and development, employment or hiring, and consulting.
3. Exporters shall apply to the Ministry of Commerce for export licenses in accordance with Article 16 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. When applying to export technology, exporters shall submit a “Statement on the Transfer or Provision of Export Controlled Technology” in accordance with the requirements of Annex 1. When providing technology controlled by this Announcement to foreign organizations or individuals located within the territory of the People’s Republic of China, they shall submit a “Statement on the Provision of Export Controlled Technology within the Territory” in accordance with the requirements of Annex 2.
Export operators shall use licenses in accordance with Article 18 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items and other provisions, and fulfill reporting obligations as required by the licenses.
4. Exporters should strengthen their awareness of compliance and understand the performance indicators and primary uses of the goods, technologies, and services to be exported to determine whether they are dual-use items. If it is unclear whether the items to be transferred or provided are subject to the controls of this Announcement, or if it is unclear whether the relevant circumstances are subject to the controls of this Announcement, they may consult the Ministry of Commerce.
5. No entity or individual may provide intermediary, matchmaking, agency, freight, delivery, customs clearance, third-party e-commerce trading platform, or financial services for activities that violate this Announcement. Service providers that may involve the export of items controlled by this Announcement should proactively inquire with their service recipients about whether the relevant export activities are subject to this Announcement and whether they are currently applying for or have obtained export licenses. Export operators that have already obtained export licenses for dual-use items should proactively present these licenses to the relevant service providers.
VI. Technologies already in the public domain, technologies involved in basic scientific research, or technologies necessary for ordinary patent applications are not subject to the jurisdiction of this Announcement. From the effective date of this Announcement, anyone who discloses to unspecified parties technologies not in the public domain and subject to control under this Announcement without permission will be penalized in accordance with Article 34 of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China.
7. Chinese citizens, legal persons and unincorporated organizations shall not provide any substantial assistance or support for overseas rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilization activities without permission. Any violation of the requirements of this announcement shall be punished in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items.
8. This Announcement shall take effect from the date of publication. The Export Control List of Dual-Use Items of the People’s Republic of China shall be updated simultaneously.
Venture capitalists in clean tech are starting to say out loud what they’ve suspected for a while: China’s dominance has left key sectors in the West uninvestable.
A group of eight VCs from Western firms agreed to share with Bloomberg the details of a July road trip across China during which they visited factories, spoke with startup investors, and interviewed founders of companies.
Planet A Ventures, a Berlin-based VC, has decided that investments in Western startups spanning battery manufacturing and recycling, electrolysers, solar and hardware for wind are no longer viable, says Nick de la Forge, general partner and co-founder of the firm. He says before the trip he’d suspected China was way ahead; but after going there, those sectors are now “strictly off the list.”
air Reem, a partner at Extantia Capital, says the trip has already led his firm to halt investments in Western battery cell manufacturers. Instead, they’ll look for ways to collaborate with Chinese firms across supply chains. When it comes to battery manufacturing in the West, China’s dominance means it’s now “game over,” according to Reem.
Ashwin Shashindranath, a former Macquarie Group managing director who’s now a partner at Energy Impact Partners, says what he saw on the trip made it “very clear” that Western investors live “in a bubble” in their misconceptions about China.
China manufactures about 80% of the world’s solar panels, supplies some 60% of the planet’s wind turbines, 70% of its EVs and 75% of batteries, all at a lower financial cost than the West.
What’s more, China’s share of global clean energy patents stands at around 75%, while the country dominates the supply chain for the critical minerals that underpin many green technologies.
The Bloomberg article also features a photo of the intrepid travelers:
Is there an Old China Hand in the picture?
This is what happens to all China-virgins. For a first time visitor to China it can be an overwhelming experience. Everything seems so wonderful and perfect.
Of course everyone knows China best on the day after arrival in Beijing. But it takes a bit more to get to the bottom of things than lurking for a couple of days in sneakers on guided tours through picture-perfect factories.
Propaganda fodder
While Bloomberg is blocked in China, like all western news outlets are, the Communist Party’s English language propaganda foghorn Global Times was quick to pick up the Bloomberg piece and turn it into propaganda.
Learn from experience
We have first hand experience of visiting glorious new factories. On unannounced surprise visits days after the “guided tours” we found several times, that the factory we had been shown was just that: for show. Actually the bulk of the products were produced elsewhere in factories that looked and operated distinctly differently.
There are other things like dysfunctional quality control in spite of ISO certification, pre- or raw materials of an industrial standard that does not meet the requirements for manufacturing the expected quality of finished product, etc. Basically all the shortcuts one can take when it comes to making things at very competitive cost are being used.
We do not say this is the rule, but it happens more often than comfortable.
As a South East Asian owner of two high-class China-made EVs told us succinctly:
The [mainland] Chinese are very good at making things look better than they are.
Uninvestable?
Had this been a rare earth mission, the impression would have been the same. Western rare earth being uninvestable.
“China does not want to aid the production of weapons that can threaten China” or how western rare earths became investable
From events and publications around February 2021 and utterings from China’s low-ranked Ministry of Commerce as well as from the top-ranked National Development & Reform Commission a year later, one could sense that something like limiting the West’s access to rare earth was being considered.
We did not believe that China would undertake such an unwise step. Every industrialised economy requires full and unhindered access to rare earth compounds, rare earth metals and rare earth magnets. Any access limitation must inevitably lead to “rare earth proliferation” in the West, eroding China’s dominant position.
Well, on 4 April 2025 China did it. It limited access to 7 rare earths. And now it increased the number to 12 rare earths.
And that is how the West’s rare earths have become investable.
The United States is negotiating to create a $5 billion fund to invest in mining, which would mark the government’s largest direct involvement in critical mineral deals. The proposed fund would form a joint venture between the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC) and New York investment firm Orion Resource Partners, according to sources familiar with the matter.
Sources said the two parties would each contribute equal amounts to reach a combined total of $5 billion over time, sources familiar with the talks said. Key terms remain under negotiation, and officials have not guaranteed a deal. The fund would mirror Orion’s $1.2 billion partnership earlier this year with Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund ADQ.
These guys also think that rare earths are investible.
Perhaps they should remember what the market is before burning large amounts of money. China exported in 2024:
Rare earth compounds worth US$424 mio
Rare earth metals worth US$93.4 mio
Rare earth permanent magnets worth US$3.4 bio
That is the total actual market to be attended to.
So if a junior rare earth miner comes to you and pretends to be able to sell rare earth products worth US$400-500 mio/year, you will know you are talking to someone who either has not the very remotest clue about the current rare earth market, or it is a snake-oil salesman only trying to relieve you from your excess cash.
You can’t reasonably expect to fully replace China, so plan prudently. Focus should first be on what is, not on what could be.
This is the status quo needing attention in rare earth compounds:
Strictly speaking “red lamp phosphors” should be licensable as well.
As you can see, 9,757 t of the 13,609 t were lanthanum and cerium compounds. That is 71% of all rare earth compounds China ships to the US. Is anybody paying attention?
Once you have a grip on what is, you can attend to visions of blue-eyed, sponsored consultants who foghorn unrealistic forecasts on behalf of their junior rare earth miner clients.
If someone has got visions, he should go and see a doctor.
Critical Metals +75.2% post-market Friday following a Reuters report that Trump administration officials have discussed taking a stake in the company whose flagship project, the Tanbreez mine in Greenland, is one of the world’s largest rare earth deposits.
Critical Metals, which agreed to buy the Tanbreez deposit last year for $5 million in cash and $211 million in stock, applied in June for a $50 million grant through the Defense Production Act, but the Trump administration has begun discussions with the company about converting the grant into an equity stake, according to the report.
The question arises:
Is there any folly in rare earths that the current US government is not capable of committing?
Tanbreez is under-explored. Current exploration status is around 10%.
By current exploration results the assumed to be rare earth resource of Tanbreez is eudialyte.
In spite of soon a century of attempts, separation of rare earths from a eudialyte resource has never been successful.
There are theoretical papers that suggest it could be done, but also warn of unsustainably high acid consumption. Also these papers remain inconclusive and vague as regards full separation of rare earths from a eudialyte resource.
And if none of the above should be convincing, here the knock-out: Even the Grand Masters of Rare Earth in China have given up on eudialyte.
EURARE validation of eudialyte?
Leading Edge Materials recently argued in an appeal for a license for their Norra Kärr eudialyte deposit (absolutely lousy 0.4% TREO) that the EURARE project of the EU should have proven the processability of eudialyte.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
The EURARE project was to test an EU value chain from mine to metal, based on EU and Greenland rare earth resources. Norra Kärr was part of that.
Fact is that no separated rare earths ever made it to the last step of the chain, metallisation at LCM in the UK, as LCM confirmed to us.
EURARE rare earth separation failure
The rare earth separation entity participating in the EURARE project chose not to respond to our questions, which tells volumes.
We conclude: Separation of rare earths from all the EURARE participating resources has failed.
Does anyone in Washington DC hear the explosions? Apparently not.
Go big or go home is not a valid concept in rare earths
Throwing large amounts of money around just won’t solve the US problem. The US do not have the market for that and they are wasting your financial resources.
In 2017 during the current US government’s version 1.0 it gave away control over the largest rare earth mine on the American continent to China for US$20.5 mio. And now the US must spend hundreds of millions to regain control and proceeded to create a subsidy-dependent rare earth Frankenstein. The US government may live to curse the day when it made the decision to “go big” on that one.
The concept that is sure to work
Small is beautiful. The US market for rare earth compounds is comparatively small and fragmented, like all ex-China rare earth markets tend to be. It is important that the full range of all lanthanides is being separated based on PROVENLY WORKING processes of PROVENLY WORKING rare earth resources.
At this time the US should forget about anything that is “creative, new process” (DoE “embargo technology”) or “new resources” (recycling, coal).
The US should stick to what provenly works in practise on an industrial scale.
Some reality
Do the US want to be the leader in AI and AI datacenters? Then the US will also need motherlodes of yttrium. Which one of the rare-earth-virgins promoting their mostly worthless rare earth projects has ever pointed the US government to this fact?
The top-professionals at Ucore even want to deplete yttrium, which shows that they have just absolutely no idea at all about the market they plan to attend to. But that really does not matter, as there is zero evidence of Ucore’s abbreviated process working anyway. Consequently market- and product competence may be the very last of Ucore’s concerns.
Does the US government know that the US is the world’s single largest consumer of lutetium? Any word about that from the rare-earth-virgins the US government is asking for advice? Probably not. Because the only rare-earthy thing these “advisors” can spell in rare earths has four letters: NdPr.
And how about samarium, the US’ default defense-use magnet material? Or gadolinium, the US’ must-have for electronic warfare?
Inadvertently China’s government had passed a shopping list to the US government on 4 April 2025. It contains all the products the US really need to prioritise. NdPr was not among them. Chinese rare earth permanent magnets are not explicitly mentioned on the shopping list, they are more of collateral damage, considering massive Chinese rare earth permanent magnet capacities that actually require free-flowing magnet exports from China.
What may work?
With an optimistic view of things, the following projects deserve the US government’s attention (this is not and will never be investment advice. It is a non-exhaustive list. Do your own diligence):
Bear Lodge, Rare Earth Element Resources, Wyoming, 4% TREO, separation process pending, permanent disposal of radioactive waste pending.
Monazite from Georgia, Chemours/Southern Ionics and/or monazite imports in combination with Energy Fuels’ separation, radioactive waste problem solved. Energy Fuels have yet to prove that they can separate the so-called “heavy rare earths”. Don’t accept explanations or excuses, all lanthanides must be separated, one-by-one. Even dirt-cheap lanthanum and cerium, representing up to 80% of US rare earth imports - which literally keep the US going, by the way.
Rainbow Rare Earths, separation of an intermediate imported from your previous friend South Africa (until you put them off unnecessarily), resource phosphogypsum stacks. [ATTENTION: Rainbow is the exception, not the rule. Not every ole phosphogypsum stack contains worthwhile quantities of recoverable rare earths. In our observation particularly valuable rare earth contents in phosphate rock resources for fertiliser production have the unfortunate habit of also ending up in the fertiliser. There have been phosphogypsum rare earth projects that have failed miserably. You have been warned].
Pea Ridge, Caldera Corp, rare earths from historic mine tailings. A bit of a long-shot, but definitely worth exploring the option. Not as a standalone on-fits-all but perhaps in combination with other worthwhile US rare earth projects.
Phoenix Tailings - separation and metallisation
These and other projects somewhat overlap. It is not the US government’s job to piece things together alone. It must enforce that domestic rare earth projects COOPERATE rather than continuously scratch each other’s eyes out.
Northern Shan State has now become an important source for China’s rare earth imports from Myanmar - and a prime destination for China’s leaching material ammonium sulphate exports.
Even as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping publicly proclaim warm relations, the importance of rare earths is driving India and China into a state of competition.
India has its own sizable rare earth reserves, but a limited capacity to exploit them. Most domestic output comes from light rare earths in coastal sands, leaving the country dependent on imports for the heavy elements needed in advanced magnets.
Lets be very blunt here. The Diplomat tries to make fishy excuses for what actually is the failure of uninspired Indian bureaucrats working at notoriously underfunded, over-staffed and inefficient Indian state-owned enterprises under complacent government oversight of only flaky competence, easy to be lied at.
There is absolutely no lack of heavy rare earths in India’s beach sand monazite.
There can be no excuses and explanations. Miserable rare earth failure of India’s bureaucracy at KABIL, IREL and OSCOM, jointly or severally, is the reason why Modi had to eat humble pie at the SCO meeting in Tianjin, China.
China and Malaysia are in early talks for a project to process rare earths, with sovereign wealth fund Khazanah Nasional likely to partner with a Chinese state-owned firm to build a refinery in the Southeast Asian nation, people familiar with the matter said.
If the joint venture takes shape, it would represent a significant policy departure for China, the world’s top supplier and refiner of rare earths, which has banned export of its processing technology to protect its dominance of the industry.
Beijing is ready to swap its technology for access to Malaysia’s untapped rare earths reserves, seeking to limit competition from Australian rival Lynas Rare Earths, opens new tab, which has a processing plant in the central state of Pahang, said two sources in Malaysia with knowledge of the talks.
Exquisitely timed to coincide with China’s national holiday plus Mid-Autumn Festival, so that no instant denials can spoil the hype.
What “reshape”? Are Malaysians really so naive to think that whatever offshore plant China would build would not operate/sell under the very same restrictions as in China?
In exchange Malaysia would need to lift its export ban on unseparated rare earths. Most if not all exports would of course head to China.
Anyway, the MOFCOM announcements today pour ice-water on the Malaysian hopes.
The proposed refinery is expected to process both light and heavy rare earths, two Malaysian sources said.
This sentence shows undisturbed rare earth virginity.
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