China: The Empire strikes back; China buys "rare earth mine" in Brazil; Iluka: Better pull the Plug; Mkango's Hypromag fog; Hastings' latest absurdity; Quadrant indicted; Singapore Rare Earth Fiction.
Rare Earths 7 December 2024 #161
Is it bad?
So-so.
As one may expect, also this time we will add our mustard to the howling of the media, but based on numbers and fact, not on generalist gibberish.
So lets dive into it straight away.
China
Announcement No. 46 of the Ministry of Commerce in 2024 Announcement on Strengthening Export Control of Dual-Use Items to the United States
[Issuing Unit] Security and Control Bureau
[Issuing Document Number] Announcement No. 46 of the Ministry of Commerce in 2024
[Issuing Date] December 3, 2024
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and other laws and regulations, in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation, it is decided to strengthen export control of dual-use items to the United States. The relevant matters are hereby announced as follows:
1. Dual-use items are prohibited from being exported to military users or for military purposes in the United States.
2. In principle, the export of dual-use items related to gallium, germanium, antimony, and super-hard materials to the United States will not be permitted; for the export of dual-use items of graphite to the United States, a stricter end-user and end-use review will be implemented.
Any organization or individual in any country or region that violates the above provisions and transfers or provides relevant dual-use items originating in the People's Republic of China to organisations and individuals in the United States will be held accountable in accordance with the law.
This announcement will be officially implemented from the date of publication.
Ministry of Commerce
December 3, 2024
Childish tit-for-tat
The looming threat had been politically more powerful than actually making good on it. Even though exports had already been nose-diving, it has now become official. Pandora’s Box has been opened and the way to a downward spiral has opened.
Eventually this one act may well be the beginning of the end of China’s dominant position in nonferrous metals.
China has its very own import dependencies, which can be comparatively easily attacked - at great economic cost.
But, as the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had made clear already 12 years ago by circulating Document No. 9, this is not about profane economic matters. It is about ideologic principle.
Prof. John Mearsheimer says:
Politics trump economics.
In the pipeline for long
As our avid readers will know, the potential of such a move has been looming for a while. As we reported more than a year ago, also RAND Corp saw it coming.
What is very notable is that generally the Chinese government actually has never needed laws for doing whatever. This changed with Xi Jin Ping rising to absolute power. He insists on the rule of law (no matter how absurd the one or the other law may be).
Rare earth relevance
As we explained before, under Chinese the Chinese dual use regulation ANY product can be deemed dual use, whether listed or not, much like the envisioned U.S. “toothbrush regulation”.
Consequently rare earths can also be put on the menu, even though a blanket export ban like here for gallium, germanium and antimony would be like China shooting itself in both feet with a .600 Nitro Express elephant rifle.
Rare earth permanent magnet relevance
Readers of this blog will know, that gallium tends also to be used as an alloy for NdFeB permanent magnets.
And here some meat on the bone:
Gallium: 96% of all gallium is a by-product from bauxite-alumina processing, such as Rio Tinto’s, who have been subject of the largest-ever single non-ferrous metal investment from China. China’s share in Rio Tinto is close to 15%. World output of gallium metal is ca. 610 metric tons, 98% made in China.
In 2023 China exported 500 kgs gallium metal to the U.S. and imported 5,000 kgs from Germany.
Germanium: Primary germanium is a by-product from zinc ore (sphalerite) processing. Resource volumes are unknown, no estimate available. China controls ca. 87% of germanium world supply.
China exported 5,870 kgs of germanium metal to the U.S. in 2023. In the same year China imported 1,000 kgs germanium metal from Belgium.
For germanium oxide China exported 915 t to the U.S. in 2023 and imported a total of 390 t in the same year.
Antimony: It is often a by-product from gold production, but China’s Hunan has also stibnite resources. China is 48% of antimony world output, followed by Tajikistan with 25%.
Concrete minimum impact on China’s exports to the U.S., based on full year 2023 numbers:
314 t of unwrought antimony, we suspect application in alloys such as gun barrels, apart from ammunition
12,000 t of flame-retardant antimony trioxide (affected: textiles, furniture, building materials, rubbers, electronics, cable insulation, coatings/paints, automotive, PET-catalyst, and so on and so on)
32,000 t of trimethyl/triethyl antimony, catalyst in the production of polyolefines (plastics polypropylene, polyethylene), mixture with halogenated (=bromine-based) flame retardants.
If you were to include items that contain antimony on the original list, the full impact of an export embargo of all things antimony to U.S. may be US$5 billion based on 2023 prices/values.
The U.S. may have to do-it-yourself based on raw material from Australia, Turkey and Bolivia. We are not sure if China has finished buying up all antimony resources in Bolivia, though.
For details of China’s exports of antimony refer to our extensive data collection we published here on 16 August 2024.
Overall the blanket ban of the exports of these three products to the U.S. is not an unsurmountable problem. But it will take time. Until then bromine-based flame retardants may see brisk business.
Among the rare earth industry expect Neo Performance Materials to profit. Neo are, by the way, the one and only currently existing western company outside Japan with a heavy rare earth separation track record. Unlike all the snake-oil salesmen out there, who relentlessly lobby the U.S. government for handouts while actually being unable to live up to self-created expectations..
Chinese Mining Giant Secures Brazilian Rare Earth Company
Taboca, Brazil’s largest refined tin producer, operates the Pitinga Mine in Presidente Figueiredo, Amazonas. This mine boasts an estimated 100-year reserve and produces 17.9 million tons of ore annually. The company sees this acquisition as a growth opportunity, potentially boosting its competitiveness and production capacity.
The mine’s output extends beyond tin. It also produces niobium, tantalum, and rare earth elements, crucial components in electronics manufacturing. FeNbTa (iron-niobium-tantalum) finds wide application in the chemical industry. It’s used to create products for electronic, aerospace, and medical device industries.
China buys rare earth mine in Brazil! THE END IS NEAR!
Here the spoiler:
No rare earth
No, Pitinga does not produce rare earth elements. It never has, it never will.
Is a tin mine. It had been tested for rare earth resource xenotime back in 2009. It has not been heard of since, which certainly is owed to the magnificent success of extracting rare earth from Pitinga during the past 15 years.
The End.
China bans use of Intel, AMD and Nvidia Processor Chips for security concerns
China has recently implemented a ban on the purchase and use of processing chips from major U.S. tech companies such as Intel, AMD, and Nvidia in products made by its small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs). This move comes amid ongoing trade and technology conflicts between the United States, led by about to become President Donald Trump, and China under President Xi Jinping’s leadership. The ban is seen as a response to the United States’ actions, which have typically involved restricting Chinese technology and products.
This decision follows a concerning report from the Cyber Security Association of China (CSAC), which on October 16, 2024, expressed alarm over the frequent detection of security vulnerabilities and high failure rates among Intel processors. The CSAC also noted similar concerns with AMD and Nvidia chips. Considering these security issues, China is focusing on in-creasing self-reliance in its tech sector, with the government pushing for more domestic production of critical components. As a result, Chinese businesses are being urged to reduce reliance on Western-made technology.
For companies like Nvidia and AMD, the Chinese market has been an important source of revenue. However, the new restrictions could significantly impact their profitability, as both companies have historically performed well in China, which has been one of their largest markets.
And more:
China fires back at Trump’s 10% tariff proposal with a 20% price cut on domestic products — Beijing's policy will negatively affect chipmakers, including Nvidia and Intel
Following President-elect Trump’s announcement of his plan to impose an additional 10% tariff on Chinese goods, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) released a draft proposal that gives domestically produced items a 20% price evaluation advantage in government procurement.
However, even though this 20% advantage applies to any item manufactured within China, the MOF proposal primarily focuses on industrial manufacturing goods, except for agricultural, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery products, and mineral resources.
Singapore Science Fiction
Could rare earth recycling relieve China of a trade trump card?
Recycling can be ramped up faster than new mines, which could take decades to become commercially viable, said Hu Xinyue, a senior analyst in the China programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
In her paper, Hu said China’s strategy of leveraging its rare earth monopoly was “highly effective” in the short term but “it may not retain the same level” of influence over the long term, because reuse and recycling strategies could meet 30 to 40 per cent of rare earth demand in the US, China and Europe by 2050.
Whatever should be recycled, must be mined first.
In our previous issue we attended to Hu Xingyue’s falsehoods already. She apparently lacks experience and expertise.
Rebel group takes key Myanmar border town and rare earth mining hub in setback for military regime
The apparent loss of Kanpaiti to the Kachin Independence Army leaves Myanmar’s military in control of only one town with a border crossing, Muse, and deprives it of potential profits from the mines that provide China with rare earth minerals critical for electric motors and wind turbines, as well as high-tech weapons and a broad range of electronics.
Neither Col. Naw Bu, the KIA’s spokesperson, nor Thet Swe, spokesperson for the military, responded to multiple requests for comment, but several local media outlets reported that Kanpaiti [Kan Paik Ti] fell last week.
Putin scolds Tomtor rare earth deposit's operator over development delays
Tomtor, located in the north of the Siberian region of Yakutia, is a key project in Russia's plans to boost output of the metals that are used in the defence industry and in making mobile phones and electric cars, to reduce reliance on imports from China.
"Those business structures that took over these deposits many years ago are not investing. We need to somehow talk to them and resolve this issue," Putin told First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov during a meeting in the Kremlin.
"Either they invest, or they establish relationships with other companies and the state. This is a strategically important resource that the state needs now," Putin added.
The Rare Earth Observer reported about the 2020 expropriation of Russian rare earth assets.
Rosatom’s “breakthrough process” so far shows little impact, as Russian rare earth raw materials exports in the form of mixed rare earth carbonate to China keep increasing.
As we reported the target capacity for Russia’s rare earth seems to be 1,250 t/year.
Extraterritorial Application of EU Sanctions Targeting Russia?
On 22 November 2024, the European Commission (the “Commission”) issued new frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding the interpretation of the “Best Efforts” obligation in Article 8a of Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 (“Regulation 833/2014”). Introduced as part of the EU’s 14th package of sanctions against Russia in June 2024, Article 8a of Regulation 833/2014 requires all EU operators to “undertake their best efforts to ensure that any legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine” the sanctions in Regulation 833/2014. The same obligations are included in Article 8i of Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, which sets out the EU sanctions against Belarus.
Importantly, the FAQs suggest that EU operators are required to ensure – on a best-efforts basis – compliance with EU trade/sectoral sanctions against Russia by all its non-EU subsidiaries, particularly those located outside of Russia. The FAQs appear to introduce an extra-territorial element to the relevant sanctions regimes by effectively requiring, for example, subsidiaries located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Singapore that are owned or controlled by EU operators to comply with the relevant EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The FAQs represent a significant departure from the EU’s longstanding position on the non-extraterritoriality of EU sanctions, particularly in relation to foreign incorporated subsidiaries and appear to suggest that EU persons will now need to monitor the internal governance processes and procedures of non-EU subsidiaries not subject to EU law for compliance with applicable EU sanctions.
How about EU company subsidiaries in China?
Nigeria
France not taking over Nigeria’s mining industry — Presidency
France signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to develop joint projects aimed at promoting and diversifying the critical minerals value chain in the solid minerals sectors of both countries.
The MoU, signed during President Tinubu’s official visit to France, focuses on collaboration in research, training, and student exchange programmes between Franco-Nigerian institutions to facilitate knowledge and skills transfer.
The agreement, however, led to speculations on social media that France was strategizing to take over Nigeria’s mining and solid minerals industry.
Reacting to these claims, Dare explained that nowhere in the document was it agreed or suggested that Nigeria had signed away mining rights to France
The EU reaching out. Good luck with maintaining compliance.
//Science
Spark Award 2024: procedure for recycling rare earth metals receives award
The jury expressed its conviction in its appraisal that this method would pave the way for the more efficient recycling of rare earth elements. The transition from the laboratory to the market was promising and so therefore also was the impact of the invention. “If our electronic waste becomes a resource and no longer ends up at landfills, our dependence on external procurement sources will decrease,” explained jury member Olivier Enger, Senior Innovation Manager at BASF.
Relevant papers you can download from the REEcover website. Lamp phosphors are an underestimated dependence on a single supplier.
Using ligands for recovery of rare earths is not new. IBC Technology’s MRT bases on ligands, too. An expensive hobby.
Korea
Recovering rare earth metals from waste permanent magnets
Korea imports 95% of its core minerals such as lithium, nickel, and rare earths.
China, a major producer of rare metals, is controlling the supply through its strategy of weaponizing resources, putting great pressure on the domestic industry.
Dr. Jae-Woo Choi and his team at the Center for Water Cycle Research at the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) have developed a fiber-based recovery material that can recover rare earth metals such as neodymium (Nd) and dysprosium (Dy) with high efficiency.
Here the link to the publication.
China
Refinement Mechanism of the Hypoeutectic Al–7Si Alloy by Adding a Novel La-Rich Rare-Earth Grain Refiner
This work is based on the development of a novel La-riched grain refiner, i.e., Al–3Ti–4.35La, which exhibited remarkable efficiency for grain refinement from 1.46 mm into ~ 0.1 mm (with 0.2 wt pct of the refiner), increasing both tensile strength, yield strength, elongation and hardness from 154.3 MPa, 64.5 MP, 5.83 pct, and 54.8 HV to 178.3 MPa (an enhancement of 15.6 pct), 77.5 MPa(an enhancement of 20.2 pct), 12.02 pct (an enhancement of 106.0 pct), and 58.4 HV (an increase of 6.6 pct), respectively.
Much if not most of China’s research goes into lanthanum and cerium, in order to solve the inherent imbalance problem that all rare earth developments everywhere suffer from.
Little to none research into this is done elsewhere. If China should solve the inherent imbalance problem by finding new, high volume applications for La and Ce, it will be of enormous benefit for the feasibility of global rare earth developers.
All paid for by the Chinese tax payer, by the way.
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